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I.  Introduction 
 
Foodborne illness remains an ongoing public health 
challenge in both the developing and industrialized worlds.1 In the 
United States, almost 50 million reported cases of infectious disease 
occur every year from a food product, resulting in substantial 
morbidity and mortality with economic burdens to health care and 
productivity.2 Despite recognition as a leader in food safety, the U.S. 
experiences longstanding and novel issues in food safety.3 Advances 
in whole genome sequencing (WGS) promise to bolster food safety 
regulators’ capabilities to identify pathogens and determine their 
source.4 However, inefficiencies in tracing food products through the 
supply chain remain.5  
 
Simultaneously, practical applications are beginning to 
emerge for new distributed ledger technologies, including 
blockchain.6 First popularized by the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, 
blockchain has been hailed as a transformative technology for any 
industry engaged in recordkeeping.7 Blockchain has attracted 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; Master of Science 
and Technology Policy, 2017, Arizona State University. With many thanks to Gary 
Marchant and David McCarville for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Diane G. Newell et al., Food-Borne Diseases — The Challenges of 20 Years Ago 
Still Persist While New Ones Continue to Emerge, 139 INT’L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 
S3, S4 (2010). 
2 Robert L. Scharff, Economic burden from health losses due to foodborne illness in 
the United States, 75 J. FOOD PROT. 123, 123 (2012). 
3 RENÉE JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FDA FOOD SAFETY 
MODERNIZATION ACT (P.L. 111-353) 1 (Feb. 18, 2011). 
4 Jennifer L. Gardy & Nicholas J. Loman, Towards A Genomics-Informed, Real-
Time, Global Pathogen Surveillance System, 19 NATURE REV. GENETICS 9 (2018).  
5 Thea King et al., Food Safety for Food Security: Relationship Between Global 
Megatrends and Developments in Food Safety, 68 TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 160, 
170 (2017). 
6 DYLAN YAGA ET AL., U.S. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8202, 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/i 
r/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf [hereinafter NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ]. 
7 Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, Jan.–Feb. 2017 
HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017), https://enterprisersproject.com/sites/default/files/th 
e_truth_about_blockchain.pdf. 
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massive investments for its broad applications in finance.8 
Meanwhile, academic and industry research on blockchain has 
exploded since 2012.9 Though blockchain applications have only 
begun to surface, other sectors including healthcare, energy, and 
government services stand to benefit from this technological 
revolution.10  
 
New pilot projects suggest blockchain may also serve a 
public health function as applied to food safety,11 potentially 
overlapping with WGS advances. Blockchain in the food industry 
promises increased traceability of food products through the supply 
chain, as well as reduced fraud and counterfeiting of food products.12 
In 2017, Walmart and IBM began a collaboration to pilot blockchain 
in the food supply chain to hasten responses and reduce waste during 
an outbreak of foodborne illness.13 Federal regulators in the U.S. 
have gained interest in exploring this application of blockchain 
technologies in the wake of two lettuce E. coli outbreaks during 2018 
which suffered from traceability issues.14 Given their complementary 
 
8 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Demystifying the Blockchain, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/blockchain-technology.ht 
ml. 
9 Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—
A Systematic Review, 11 PLOS ONE 10.1371,  9–10 (2016).  
10 U.K. GOV’T OFFICE SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK 
CHAIN 64–71 (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technolog 
y.pdf; Katharine Gammon, Experimenting with Blockchain: Can One Technology 
Boost Both Data Integrity and Patients’ Pocketbooks?, 24 NATURE MED. 378, 381 
(2018); Mike Orcutt, How Blockchain Could Give Us a Smarter Energy Grid, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609077/how-
blockchain-could-give-us-a-smarter-energy-grid/. 
11 See generally Frank Yiannas, A New Era of Food Transparency Powered by 
Blockchain, 12 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 46 (2018). 
12 Sylvian Charlebois, How Blockchain Technology Could Transform the Food 
Industry, CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-
blockchain-technology-could-transform-the-food-industry-89348. 
13 See IBM Announces Major Blockchain Collaboration with Dole, Driscoll’s, 
Golden State Foods, Kroger, McCormick and Company, McLane Company, Nestlé, 
Tyson Foods, Unilever and Walmart to Address Food Safety Worldwide, IBM (Aug. 
22, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/53013.wss (detailing 
IBM’s announcement in 2017 that it would begin a major blockchain collaboration 
with various companies, including Walmart as well as blockchain’s suitability to 
combat food waste problems) [hereinafter IBM Press Release]. 
14 Maggie Fox, The FDA Thinks Walmart May Have One Solution to Romaine 
Lettuce Recalls, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/heal 
th-news/fda-thinks-walmart-may-have-one-solution-romaine-lettuce-recalls-
n940826.  
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nature, industry-driven blockchain projects could soon converge 
with government-based WGS infrastructure to provide a more 
comprehensive approach to responding to foodborne illness. 
Accomplishing this goal will require addressing regulatory and 
technical hurdles.  
 
This article illustrates opportunities and obstacles arising 
from combining blockchain and WGS in food safety. Part I reviews 
food safety regulatory infrastructure in the U.S. and recent advances 
in WGS. Part II describes the rise of blockchain and its application 
in the food supply chain. Part III presents the promise of successfully 
combining blockchain and WGS tools alongside governance 
challenges and opportunities, pointing to soft law approaches 
including voluntary regulatory programs and technical standards as 
a potential path forward.  
 
II.  Food Safety Oversight and Whole Genome 
Sequencing 
  
Ensuring food safety and preventing foodborne illness 
represent common, pervasive public health challenges for every 
nation and state.15 Nearly 50 million individuals in the U.S. become 
ill after exposure to contaminated food products in a single year.16 
Food poisoning may produce more mild symptoms of gastric distress 
but can also yield potentially fatal liver, kidney, and neurological 
complications.17 In turn, foodborne illnesses in the U.S. result in 
128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 mortalities annually.18 Globally, 
food poisoning strikes 600 million individuals, resulting in 420,000 
 
15 See INST. MED., ADDRESSING FOODBORNE THREATS TO HEALTH: POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND GLOBAL COORDINATION 3 (2006) (“Ensuring the safety of food is a 
long-standing and critical objective of public health. The estimate that millions of 
Americans—whose food is among the safest on earth—are sickened by tainted food 
each year attests to the need to further safeguard our food supply, while the mounting 
threat of terrorism lends this mission a particular urgency.”). 
16 See L. Hannah Gould et al., Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks --- 
United States, 2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1197, 1197 (2011) 
(“Foodborne agents cause an estimated 48 million illnesses annually in the United 
States.”). 
17 See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States., 5 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 607, 607 (1999) (“[S]ymptoms of foodborne illness 
range from mild gastroenteritis.”). 
18 Foodborne Illness and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.  
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fatalities.19 Foodborne illness may have disparate impacts on 
vulnerable groups, including minorities and people of lower 
socioeconomic status,20 suggesting health justice as a needed lens for 
this public health hazard.21 Consumers consistently rate food 
poisoning among top food-related concerns, ahead of pesticides, 
antibiotics, or allergens.22 The economic burden of foodborne illness 
from common pathogens on the American healthcare system may 
approach $78 billion per year.23 
 
 The expansive scope of pathogens and food products 
contributing to foodborne illness complicates oversight for 
prevention and response.24 Myriad species of microorganisms and 
toxic metabolites lead to illness every year. Prominent pathogens are 
 
19 Food Safety: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety. 
20 See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne 
Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 681, 686 (1998) (“Foodborne illness is particularly dangerous for those 
without access to health care, including the homeless, migrant workers, and others 
of low socioeconomic status.”); Jennifer J. Quinlan, Foodborne Illness Incidence 
Rates and Food Safety Risks for Populations of Low Socioeconomic Status and 
Minority Race/Ethnicity: A Review of the Literature, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. 
HEALTH 3634, 3645–46 (2013) (discussing the impact of “greater access to small, 
independently operated food markets and fast-food/take-out restaurants” on 
minorities’ increased food poisoning rates). Cf. K. L. Newman et al., The Impact of 
Socioeconomic Status on Foodborne Illness in High-Income Countries: A 
Systematic Review, 143 EPIDEMIOL. & INFECT. 2473, 2473 (2015) (finding that the 
effect of socio-economic status, or SES, varies depending on the pathogen, but “the 
majority of identified studies for Campylobacter, salmonellosis, and E. coli infection 
showed an association between high SES and illness.”). 
21 See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. LAW 
& PUB. POL’Y 47 (2014) (arguing that health law should be used as a tool for social 
justice). 
22 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2018 FOOD 
& HEALTH SURVEY 49 (2018) (finding “[f]oodborne illness from bacteria” was 
ranked as the most important food safety issue in 2018 more often than any other 
choice); INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD & 
HEALTH SURVEY 75 (2014). 
23  See Scharff, supra note 2, at 123 (finding that the aggregated annual cost of 
foodborne illness was $77.7 billion under its enhanced model). Cf. Sandra Hoffmann 
et al., Annual Cost of Illness and Quality-Adjusted Life Year Losses in the United 
States Due to 14 Foodborne Pathogens, 75 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1292, 1292 (2012) 
(reporting an average of $14 billion annually as a result of only common pathogens). 
24 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAD BUG BOOK: HANDBOOK OF 
FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL TOXINS (2d ed. 2012) 
(providing information about major food pathogens and discussing the related 
oversight challenges) [hereinafter BAD BUG BOOK]. 
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bacterial or viral, including salmonella, E. coli, and norovirus.25 
Parasites, protozoa, prions, and chemical toxins can also contaminate 
food and cause illness.26 Every year, multiple outbreaks in meat, 
produce, and other types of consumables are investigated by federal 
regulators.27 Illness arising from all food types can give rise to 
infection, hospitalization, and mortality.28 Moreover, contamination 
vulnerabilities exist at all stages of the food supply chain, “from farm 
to table.”29 Identifying the pathogen responsible and the origin of 
contamination is a critical part of the response to an outbreak and 
preventing future outbreaks, and thus promoting food safety more 
broadly.30 Difficulties in characterizing pathogens can arise from 
food contaminated by multiple microorganisms.31 Unfortunately, 
determining the origin of an outbreak with current tools can require 
a substantial amount of time, potentially enabling the outbreak to 
propagate.32 
 
 Federal law divides regulatory authority over food safety 
between multiple agencies.33 Recently boosted by the Food Safety 
Modernization Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
primary responsibility for preventing and responding to food 
 
25 Foodborne Illnesses and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html. 
26 See BAD BUG BOOK, supra note 24 (discussing the impact of each of these 
categories of contaminants on food safety). 
27 List of Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/multistate-
outbreaks/outbreaks-list.html. 
28 John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and 
Deaths to Food Commodities by using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998–2008, 
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 407, 410–13 (2013). 
29 FED. FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/fswg_report_final.pdf. 
30 Steps in a Foodborne Outbreak Investigation, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (June 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigat 
ing-outbreaks/investigations/detection.html. See also Sébastien Pouliot & Daniel A. 
Sumner, Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality, 90 AM. 
J. AGRIC. ECON. 15, 24–25 (2008). 
31 Marion Koopmans, Food-Borne Viruses from a Global Perspective, in INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 225, 225 (2012).  
32 Il-Hoon Cho & Seockmo Ku, Current Technical Approaches for the Early 
Detection of Foodborne Pathogens: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 INT’L J. 
MOLECULAR SCI. 2078, 2079 (2017); IBM Food Trust: Trust and Transparency in 
Our Food, IBM (2018), https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/solutions/food-trust (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
33 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY IS 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 6–7 (2017).  
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contamination.34 FDA wields various tools for ensuring food safety 
including inspection, recalls, sampling, and voluntary destruction.35 
Complementing FDA jurisdiction, the Department of Agriculture’s 
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has similar authority over 
meat, poultry, and processed eggs.36 The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) conducts food safety surveillance, 
investigates multistate outbreaks, and coordinates state and local 
public health actions.37 These three federal agencies established the 
Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) in 2011 
to promote coordination and cooperation in identifying culpable 
pathogens and contaminated food products.38  
 
Despite its multi-agency scheme, gaps in U.S. food safety 
oversight remain. For example, of the nearly 50 million cases of 
foodborne illness in the U.S. each year, the responsible pathogen has 
historically only been identified in one fifth of the cases.39 In 2011, 
the FDA launched the “Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) 
Program” to enhance its food safety operations.40 WGS methods 
comprehensively decode the full genome of an organism, identifying 
 
34 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) 
(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i 
(2018)); see Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 353, 
354–55 (2011) (analyzing the new duties as well as the enhanced scope of FDA’s 
authority created by FSMA). 
35 See Deliganis, supra note 20, at 702–05 (considering the many tools available in 
FDA’s arsenal); Food: Compliance & Enforcement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Food/ComplianceEnforcement/default.htm 
(discussing FDA’s authority to take action against “adulterated” or “misbranded” 
foods); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 393(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
36 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–26 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–56 
(2019). 
37 21 U.S.C. § 2224; CDC and Food Safety, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/cdc-and-food-safety.html. See 
generally U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR 
FOODBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAKS, UNITED STATES: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016). 
38 INTERAGENCY FOOD SAFETY ANALYTICS COLLABORATION, STRATEGIC PLAN: 
CALENDAR YEAR 2017-2021 2–3 (2017). 
39 See Elaine Scallan et al., Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Major 
Pathogens, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 7, 7 (2001) (finding 9.4 million cases of 
foodborne illness caused by known, common pathogens); see also Elaine Scallan et 
al, Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Unspecified Agents, 17 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 16, 16 (2011) (finding 38.4 million cases of foodborne 
illness caused by unknown pathogens). 
40 Eric L. Stevens et al., The Public Health Impact of a Publicly Available, 
Environmental Database of Microbial Genomes, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 
(2017).  
80                   JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY          [Vol.15 
the organism by comparing the data produced through sequencing to 
reference genomic datasets.41 With the costs of WGS technology 
falling,42 the FDA program calls on laboratories to characterize the 
full genome of microbes obtained from food, environmental, and 
clinical samples in their local areas.43 The GenomeTrakr platform 
serves as a key tool in the FDA Whole Genome Sequencing Project 
by providing an international reference database of pathogen 
genomes.44 GenomeTrakr enables public health officials to infer the 
origin of contamination in food products by comparing the genomes 
of new outbreak pathogens, obtained from WGS, to references in the 
database from various geographical locations.45 In 2013, CDC 
announced its existing PulseNet network of genomic food safety 
laboratories would begin collecting WGS data.46 PulseNet aims to 
recognize outbreaks earlier by finding common strains of specific 
pathogens in different clinical cases and whole genome data should 
augment these efforts.47 FSIS contributes to both CDC’s PulseNet 
and FDA’s GenomeTrakr, and, in 2017, indicated interest in 
conducting its own analyses of pathogen genomic data.48 An 
overview of the efforts of IFSAC agencies to implement WGS 









41 Jenny C. Taylor et al., Factors Influencing Success of Clinical Genome 
Sequencing Across a Broad Spectrum of Disorders, 47 NATURE GENETICS 717, 717 
(2015). 
42 Xavier Didelot et al., Transforming Clinical Microbiology with Bacterial Genome 
Sequencing, 13 NATURE REV. GENETICS 601, 610 (2012). 
43 Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 
15, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/wholegenomesequencing 
programwgs/. 




46 PulseNet: Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pathogens/wgs.html.  
47 Id.; Fast Facts About PulseNet, U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/fast-facts.html. 
48 Use of Whole Genome Sequence Analysis to Improve Food Safety and Public 
Health, 82 Fed. Reg. 44378 (Sept. 22, 2017).  
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Figure 1. IFSAC Agencies and WGS Initiatives 
 
 
Early evidence suggests these WGS methods for pathogen 
characterization may improve the response capacity of food safety 
regulators.49 FDA reports cases showing WGS affords the ability to 
identify and distinguish between problematic pathogens in the food 
system, even in products with ingredients from diverse geographic 
locations.50 In 2013, CDC launched a pilot project to detect food 
contaminated with listeria using WGS techniques.51 Initial results 
demonstrate that WGS methods enabled public health officials to 
identify as many as 50% more related cases of foodborne listeria in 
a year and reduced the average number of cases reported per outbreak 
by up to 50%.52 The listeria project points to significant possible 
public health and economic savings by reducing the burden of 
foodborne illness.53 The expanding international adoption of 
PulseNet and GenomeTrakr should allow for further improved 
results.54 Moreover, WGS systems may offer a platform for public 
health officials to monitor the food supply chain and intervene earlier 
 
49 See E. Kurt Lienau et al., Identification of a Salmonellosis Outbreak by Means of 
Molecular Sequencing, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 981 (2011) (discussing how 
genome sequencing methods were used in identifying a salmonella outbreak in 
2009-2010). 
50 Examples of How FDA Has Used Whole Genome Sequencing of Foodborne 
Pathogens for Regulatory Purposes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm422075.htm. 
51 Brendan R. Jackson et al., Implementation of Nationwide Real-time Whole-
genome Sequencing to Enhance Listeriosis Outbreak Detection and Investigation, 
63 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DIS. 380, 380–81 (2016). 
52 Id. at 382 (comparing data from the year prior to WGS implementation to year 2 
of WGS use). 
53 Robert L. Scharff et al., An Economic Evaluation of PulseNet: A Network for 
Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S66, S66 (2016). 
54 See Marc W. Allard et al., Practical Value of Food Pathogen Traceability through 
Building a Whole-Genome Sequencing Network and Database, 54 J. CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY 1975, 1975 (2016); Celine Nadon et al., PulseNet International: 
Vision for the Implementation of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Global 
Food-Borne Disease Surveillance, 22 EUR. SURVEILLANCE 1. 
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than otherwise possible to mitigate the spread of detected 
pathogens.55 
 
Despite advances in WGS food regulation, gaps exist in 
industry and regulatory entities’ abilities to trace food through the 
supply chain.56 Paper documentation in the food supply chain 
continues to be used despite inefficiency.57 No comprehensive digital 
system exists to track food products through the supply chain, 
slowing down regulatory responses to outbreaks of foodborne 
illnesses.58 The summer 2018 regulatory investigation of an E. coli 
outbreak in lettuce from Arizona lasted for weeks,59 illustrating long 
response times despite access to CDC and FDA genomic databases. 
Challenges in traceability can lead to significant waste as well. For 
example, after struggling to identify the source of an E. coli outbreak 
in November 2018, CDC and FDA warned consumers and 
distributors to discard all romaine lettuce from all producers.60 This 
extensive response to the uncertain source of contamination further 
raised objections from farmers feeling they were unfairly forced to 
 
55 Proactive Approaches of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/W 
holeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm. 
56 See King et al., supra note 5 at 160, 170. 
57 Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain: Safety 
and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD CONTROL 172, 181 (2014). 
58 Sylvain Charlebois et al., Comparison of Global Food Traceability Regulations 
and Requirements, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1104, 1108 
(2014).  
59 Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Developments in the 
Romaine Outbreak Investigation U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm612187.ht
m. 
60 CDC Food Safety Alert: E. coli Outbreak Linked to Romaine Lettuce, U.S. CTR. 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/rele 
ases/2018/s1120-ecoli-romain-lettuce.html; Statement from FDA Commissioner 
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., On the Current Romaine Lettuce E. coli Outbreak 
Investigation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Ne 
wsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm626716.htm [hereinafter FDA 
Update]. CDC even recommended consumers discard lettuce when unsure if lettuce 
was romaine. Id. FDA Commissioner Gottlieb expressed frustration that the 
contaminated food could not be well identified or traced to specific producers. See 
Susan Scutti, Don’t Eat Romaine Lettuce, CDC Urges Amid E. coli Concerns, CNN 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/health/romaine-lettuce-e-coli-
cdc/index.html. Some commentators were wry in their description of the regulatory 
inefficiency. See, e.g., Tom McKay, CDC: Do Not Eat Any Romaine Lettuce Until 
We Can Figure Out What the Hell Is Going On, GIZMODO (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://gizmodo.com/cdc-do-not-eat-any-romaine-lettuce-until-we-can-figure-1830 
580265. 
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carry the costs of traceability issues.61 New approaches for digitally 
managing food safety data and tracing food products will be needed 
to complement other advances in preventing and responding to 
foodborne illness.  
 
III.  Blockchain and Applications in the Food Supply 
Chain 
  
Improving traceability in the food supply chain may require 
novel tools. Opportunities to optimize and streamline the food safety 
infrastructure and to trace contaminated foods identified by WGS 
through the supply chain may arise with new technological 
approaches offered by blockchain.62 These approaches offer 
platforms for a host of participants to collectively build a record of 
data while ensuring that only one, authoritative version exists at any 
time.63 
 
Blockchain represents a large category of upcoming 
technologies anchored in the larger umbrella of distributed ledger 
technologies.64 Blockchain systems have gained substantial attention 
by stakeholders from myriad industries due to several key elements 
 
61 See Martin Finucane & Katie Camero, Farmer Worries CDC Has Gone Too Far 
With Its Lettuce Warning, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.bostonglob 
e.com/metro/2018/11/23/has-cdc-gone-too-far-with-its-lettuce-warning/F6WaKxS 
WQ81AsZtg8lLjuO/story.html. Some groups began labeling lettuce by its location 
and date of harvesting in response. Jesse Newman, Lettuce Producers Prepare 
Labeling Changes in Response to New E. coli Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lettuce-producersprepare-labeling-changes-in-
response-to-newe-coli-outbreak-1543255194?mod=hp_lead_pos10. 
62 See generally Massimo Di Pierro, What Is the Blockchain?, 19 COMPUTING SCI. 
& ENGINEERING 92 (2017); Explainer: What Is a blockchain?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 
23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610833/explainer-what-is-a-block 
chain/. 
63 See, e.g., Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain: A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives 
Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk Notes, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 257, 262 (2017) (discussing the efficiency of blockchains compared to a 
centralized system); see Sorkin, supra note 8 (comparing blockchains to the use of 
Google Docs).  
64 WORLD BANK GROUP, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND 
BLOCKCHAIN 1 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1779115137140 
62215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Blockchain-
Fintech-Notes.pdf; R3, BLOCKCHAIN BYTE: WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A 
BLOCKCHAIN AND A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER? 2–3 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites 
/default/files/2017_BC_Byte.pdf. 
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of the technology.65 First, blockchain acts as a ledger or recording 
system for data or transactions.66 Data are loaded onto the ledger in 
discrete “blocks” and coupled to the prior block, forming a “chain” 
with a timeline.67 Second, blocks are placed on the ledger 
chronologically and users can view all blocks dating back to the 
original.68 Third, that ledger is distributed across all nodes in the 
system, signifying that all users have a copy of the record.69 Finally, 
verified blocks become immunized from changes by individual 
users, because altering an old block requires a majority of nodes to 
agree on the change.70  
 
Classifying blockchains can occur in multiple manners, 
though a useful lens comes from viewing systems as permissioned or 
permissionless, public or private (as in Figure 2).71 Permissionless 
blockchains enable any party to add a block to the chain, where 
permissioned systems require users to first obtain prior authorization 
from an administrator.72 The public-private dimension instead 
distinguishes whether anyone can access and review data stored on 
the ledger, or if only authorized entities can access the information.73 
While Bitcoin functions as a public, permissionless system without 
a central authority, businesses looking for more top-down 
 
65 The National Academies describes blockchain as “a technology meant to achieve 
and unalterable, decentralized, public, append-only log of transactions, without any 
single authority in a position to change the log.” NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., 
SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 103 (2018).  
66 See NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–1717 (explaining the ways blockchain can 
track data); Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and 
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2293 (2016).  
67 NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–17; Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 66, 
at 2293; see also Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin & Paul Haynes, Governance 
in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134, 136 (2016). 
68 X. Xu et al., A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design, 
in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE (ICSA) 
243, 244 (2017). 
69 WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 64, at 5–6; see also R3, supra note 64, at 2 
(noting that while blockchains are distributed, they can be built as both centralized 
or decentralized systems). 
70 Nir Kshetri, Blockchain’s Roles in Strengthening Cybersecurity and Protecting 
Privacy, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1027, 1027–28 (2017); see Yli-Huumo et al., supra 
note 9, at 3 (discussing the process of forming blockchain). 
71 Weizhi Meng et al., When Intrusion Detection Meets Blockchain Technology: A 
Review, 6 IEEE ACCESS 10179, 10183 (2018). 
72 See NIST REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
73 See Meng et al., supra note 71, at 10183. 
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approaches generally select private and permissioned schemes.74 
These characteristics may change the method of verifying blocks 
before being added to the immutable chain, called consensus 
models.75 Proof of work consensus models have become 
commonplace in permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin, which 
competitively reward the first participating node to verify blocks by 
solving algorithmic “puzzles.”76 However, consensus protocols 
better suited for permissioned systems may provide useful 
alternatives to proof of work models and their high fiscal and energy 
costs.77 For greater flexibility, data recorded on the distributed ledger 
and associated applications can be stored on- or off-chain.78  
 
Figure 2. Basic Blockchain Structural Classifications79 
 
 
74 Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain, 
IBM BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-
difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/. 
75 For a comprehensive review of consensus mechanisms, see NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra 
note 6, at 18–24. 
76 Id. at 19–20. 
77 See id. at 21–24; CATHERINE MULLIGAN ET. AL. BLOCKCHAIN BEYOND THE HYPE 
5, WORLD ECON. F. (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/48423_Whether_Block 
chain_WP.pdf. 
78 See Jose Luis Bellod Cisneros et al., Public Health Surveillance using 
Decentralized Technologies, 1 BLOCKCHAIN HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 7 (2018). 
79 Adapted from information in NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6; Meng et al., 
supra note 71, at 10183. 
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 Blockchain has gained a reputation as a financial technology, 
with its popularization through Bitcoin and the oscillating market 
value of cryptocurrencies since then.80 However, blockchain 
applications also offer substantial promise in the health care and 
public health sectors.81 Perhaps best documented is the anticipated 
application of blockchain to power electronic health records to 
enhance privacy and portability.82 But various other opportunities to 
advance public health through blockchain exist, including tracing 
medical products through the supply chain.83 Converging with the 
interest in blockchain for logistics,84 blockchain has been proposed 
as a system to track prescription opioids through the drug supply 
chain.85  
 
 The intersection of blockchain, supply chain logistics, and 
public health has recently sparked attention for its applications in 
food safety. In August 2017, IBM and food industry giants including 
Walmart announced a partnership to pilot a blockchain-based food 
surveillance system.86 The permissioned IBM platform aims to 
record data throughout the supply chain for individual food batches 
including location of origin, identification numbers, expiration dates, 
shipping records, and other processing information.87 Notably, the 
Walmart-IBM collaboration promises to identify the source of an 
 
80 See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS, 
MERCATUS CTR. 1–2, 6 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/gmu_bitcoin 
_042516_webv3_0.pdf. 
81 Ron Ribitzky et al., Pragmatic, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Blockchain and 
Distributed Ledger Technology: Paving the Future for Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN 
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 5–9 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.p 
hp/journal/article/view/24/21. 
82 See Gammon, supra note 10, at 378–79. 
83 Liam Bell et al., Applications of Blockchain Within Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN 
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 2 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.php 
/journal/article/view/8/29. 
84 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRADE TECH – A NEW AGE FOR TRADE AND SUPPLY 
CHAIN FINANCE 11 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Trade_Te 
ch_report_2018.pdf.  
85 Susan Galer, Betting on Blockchain as a Miracle Cure for the $78 Billion Opioid 
Crisis, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/09/12/bett 
ing-on-blockchain-as-a-miracle-cure-for-the-78b-opioid-crisis/. 
86 IBM Press Release, supra note 13. 
87 Brigid McDermott, Improving Confidence in Food Safety with IBM Blockchain, 
IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2 
017/09/improving-confidence-in-food-safety-with-ibm-blockchain/. (In general, 
relevant supply chain data loaded on the blockchain may include “time, location, 
price, parties involved, and other relevant information when an item changes 
ownership.”); See Kshetri, supra note 70, at 1034. 
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outbreak “in seconds rather than days or weeks.”88 The blockchain 
application could give retailers the confidence to only discard food 
products from the affected farms, rather than wasting considerably 
more food.89 By September 2018, Walmart announced it would 
retain the program permanently to trace lettuce products.90 Walmart 
will require direct suppliers and over 100 upstream farms to comply 
over the course of 2019.91 
 
 Though no public data on the project have been released, the 
Walmart-IBM pilot offers a valuable case study in leveraging 
distributed ledger technology to promote public health.92 The 
preliminary reports of success for blockchain in the food supply 
chain will likely draw further interest from industry competitors and 
regulators alike for uses beyond leafy greens.93 In November 2018, 
the French distributor Auchan SA announced its own blockchain 
 
88 See IBM Press Release, supra note 13. 
89 IBM Food Trust Expands Blockchain Network to Foster a Safer, More 
Transparent and Efficient Global Food System, IBM (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2018-10-08-IBM-Food-Trust-Expands-Blockchain-
Network-to-Foster-a-Safer-More-Transparent-and-Efficient-Global-Food-System; 
see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
90 Matt Smith, In Wake of Romaine E. coli Scare, Walmart Deploys Blockchain to 
Track Leafy Greens, WALMART , https://news.walmart.com/_news_/2018/09/24/in-
wake-of-romaine-e-coli-scare-walmart-deploys-blockchain-to-track-leafy-greens 
(last accessed Apr. 8, 2019). 
91 Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks 
Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/bu 
siness/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html; Kim S. Nash, Walmart Requires Lettuce, 
Spinach Suppliers to Join Blockchain, WSJ BLOG (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/09/24/walmart-requires-lettuce-spinach-suppliers-
to-join-blockchain/. 
92 The late 2018 expansion of the pilot to include European food distributor 
Carrefour may open more opportunities for evaluation. See Food Traceability: 
Carrefour, a Blockchain Pioneer in Europe, Has Joined the IBM Food Trust 
Platform to Take Action on a Global Scale (Oct. 8, 2018), 
http://www.carrefour.com/current-news/food-traceability-carrefour-a-blockchain-
pioneer-in-europe-has-joined-the-ibm-food. However, should the pilot fail and these 
industry leaders abandon a blockchain approach, this may ripple into the food supply 
chain industry. See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, When Early Adopters 
Don’t Adopt, 357 SCIENCE 135, 135–36 (2017). 
93 See From Shore to Plate: Tracking Tuna on the Blockchain, PROVENANCE (July 
15, 2016), https://www.provenance.org/tracking-tuna-on-the-blockchain. 
Contamination in other common food products also cause public health burdens, as 
the 2018 FSIS recalls on raw beef indicate. See News Release, U.S. Food Safety & 
Inspection Serv., JBS Tolleson, Inc. Recalls Raw Beef Products Due to Possible 
Salmonella Newport Contamination (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps 
/portal/fsis/topics/recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recall-case-
archive/archive/2018/recall-085-2018-EXP-release. 
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pilot to trace meat and vegetables through the supply chain.94 The 
World Wildlife Fund has launched a blockchain project to trace tuna 
through the supply chain in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji.95 
Insurers may support the drive towards blockchain, given the 
potential for lowering fiscal risk in the food supply chain.96 
Publicized foodborne illness outbreaks may add pressure to adopt 
blockchain, with some coverage casting blockchain as a potential 
solution to traceability issues arising from the November 2018 E. coli 
outbreak.97 CDC and FDA already collaborate with IBM on 
blockchain applications in public health,98 and may take new steps to 
infuse their food safety operations with blockchain.99 While vital to 
acknowledge that blockchain technology cannot solve all 
problems,100 its potential to reduce foodborne illness will likely drive 
further experimentation and implementation. 
 
IV.  Governance Considerations for Combining 
Blockchain and Genomics 
  
Two rising trends in food safety may soon converge. On one 
side, food regulators have begun to implement WGS methods and 
databases to enhance responses to foodborne illness, aiming also to 
 
94 Globalized blockchain: Auchan implements food traceability technology on 
international scale, FOODINGREDIENTSFIRST (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.foodingr 
edientsfirst.com/news/globalized-blockchain-auchan-implements-food-
traceability-technology-on-international-scale.html 
95 New Blockchain Project Has Potential to Revolutionize Seafood Industry, WORLD 
WILDLIFE FUND (Jan 8, 2018), https://www.wwf.org.nz/what_we_do/marine/blockc 
hain_tuna_project/. 
96 See David Hundeyin, Australian Insurer Announces Blockchain Trial for Beef 
Export Supply Chain, CCN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/australian-
insurer-announces-blockchain-trial-for-beef-export-supply-chain/. 
97 See Bruce Y. Lee, What Blockchain Has to Do with Turkey, Romaine Lettuce, and 
Food Safety, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2018/ 
11/28/what-does-blockchain-have-to-do-with-turkey-lettuce-and-food-safety/#41fb 
5c7b7399. 
98 Steven Melendez, How IBM and the CDC Are Testing Blockchain to Track Health 
Issues Like the Opioid Crisis, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fastcom 
pany.com/90231255/how-ibm-and-the-cdc-are-testing-blockchain-to-track-health-
issues-like-the-opioid-crisis; IBM Watson Health Announces Collaboration to Study 
the Use of Blockchain Technology for Secure Exchange of Healthcare Data, IBM 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51394.wss. 
99 See Fox, supra note 14. 
100 R. Jᴇꜱꜱᴇ MᴄWᴀᴛᴇʀꜱ, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financ 
ial_infrastructure.pdf. 
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augment prevention efforts.101 On the other, private industry is 
developing blockchain capabilities for data recording to streamline 
regulatory compliance and minimize discarded products during an 
outbreak. Blockchain offers strengths to cover the weaknesses of 
WGS, enabling officials to trace contaminated food products through 
the supply chain and potentially increasing data liquidity.102 In turn, 
whole genomic sequencing methods should enable determining the 
exact type of pathogen and its geographical origin, when blockchain 
is limited to tracing backwards rather than starting at the beginning. 
If combined effectively, the nexus of blockchain and WGS could 
enhance the capacity of public health actors to respond to and prevent 
foodborne illness mortality and morbidity.  
 
More specifically, benefits might accrue from fusing the 
power of WGS methods and government reference databases with 
the advantages of blockchain containing an authoritative, 
timestamped, readily searchable record (as depicted in Figure 3). 
Since blockchain systems likely cannot store the amount of data 
constituting a full genomic sequence,103 useful information about 
each sequenced organism including species and location could 
instead be recorded directly on the chain.104 The full DNA sequence 
of pathogens could instead be stored “off the chain,”105 with a central 
authority providing permission to access the full sequence data on 
request by public health officials. In one possible scheme, during an 
outbreak of foodborne illness, pathogen information from clinical 
samples could be compared to reference databases and on-chain data 
to narrow the search for a matching organism. Permissioned access 
to off-chain genomic sequences could then be used to infer where the 






101 See Proactive Applications of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceRes 
earch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm. 
102 Halil Ibrahim Ozercan et al., Realizing the Potential of Blockchain Technologies 
in Genomics, 28 GENOME RES. 1255, 1262 (2018). 
103 See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 4–5. 
104 See Bellod Cisneros et al., supra note 78, at 5. 
105 William J. Gordon & Christian Catalini, Blockchain Technology for Healthcare: 
Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability, 16 COMPUTATIONAL 
& STRUCTURAL BIOTECH. J. 224, 228 (2018). 
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Figure 3. Potential Food Safety Benefits in Integrating 
Blockchain and WGS  
 
 
Beyond public health benefits, incentives exist to encourage 
private actors to pursue the integration of blockchain and WGS in 
food safety operations. Despite upfront costs in developing or leasing 
the blockchain platform, the Walmart case study suggests substantial 
potential savings for food distribution corporations by increasing 
response time to contamination in food products.106 The heightened 
agility and specificity offered by combining WGS and blockchain 
should therefore promote greater internal savings and less waste for 
industry actors. More targeted responses to contamination should 
also protect farming entities from the economic impact of distributors 
discarding even uncontaminated food products when faced with 
uncertainty about the source and path of an outbreak.107 The potential 
for blockchain and WGS combination systems to streamline and 
speed compliance should reduce or mitigate regulatory penalties 
resulting from contamination.108  
 
Though offering great promise, excitement for a pragmatic 
new public health tool should be tempered by a realistic 
understanding of remaining technical, corporate, and governance 
challenges.109 Whether developers can adequately scale up the 
blockchain supply chain pilot projects remains an open question, and 
 
106 See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.  
107 See, e.g., Finucane & Camero, supra note 61. 
108 See generally, EMILY M. LANZA, CONG. RES. SERV., R43927, FOOD SAFETY 
ISSUES: FDA JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43927.pdf. 
109 See CHRIS JAIKARAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R45116, BLOCKCHAIN: BACKGROUND 
AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45116.pdf. 
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may require years to accomplish.110 Scaling up may also come with 
added risks of cybersecurity vulnerability.111 Further increasing 
adoption of and participation in FDA and CDC pathogen sequencing 
programs will take time and appropriate standardization of the 
technology.112 Deploying blockchain and WGS sequencing 
technologies at all nodes in a food supply chain will demand 
substantial time, resources, and, likely, political capital. Notably, 
while implementing blockchain would allow for improved supply 
chain management and mitigate the extent and duration of foodborne 
illness outbreaks, it would not directly resolve existing food safety 
issues leading to contamination.113 
 
 Moreover, technical decisions about the most appropriate 
architecture for a blockchain will be required and have regulatory 
implications. Blockchain-powered food supply chain systems 
promise to reduce fraud by holding all users accountable for the data 
they enter.114 However, this benefit is only possible from within a 
permissioned blockchain system, as all users creating blocks must be 
identifiable to gain permissioned access.115 Permissionless systems 
could create insurmountable challenges in data integrity and 
compliance by enabling any party to add blocks to the ledger.116 
 
110 Evelyn Cheng, For All the Hype, Blockchain Applications Are Still Years, Even 
Decades Away, CNBC (June 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/for-all-
the-hype-blockchain-applications-are-still-years-even-decades-away.html; Melissa 
Gilmour, Blockchain for Supply Chains—More Hype Than Reality?, SWEETBRIDGE 
(June 11, 2018), https://blog.sweetbridge.com/blockchain-for-supply-chains-more-
hype-than-reality-150f9962b80c. 
111 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 84, at 11. See also, Aleksey K. Fedorov et. 
al., Quantum Computers Put Blockchain Security at Risk, 563 NATURE 465, 465–67 
(2018); Quantum Computers Pose an Imminent Threat to Bitcoin Security, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609408/quantum-
computers-pose-imminent-threat-to-bitcoin-security/. 
112 Jacob Moran-Gilad, Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Food-Borne 
Pathogen Surveillance and Control – Taking the Pulse, 22 EUROSURVEILLANCE 
30547, 30547 (2017). 
113 Jenny Splitter, Walmart’s Blockchain Offers Tech Fix, But There’s More to Leafy 
Greens Than Data, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysp 
litter/2018/09/28/walmarts-blockchain-offers-tech-fix-but-theres-more-to-leafy-
greens-than-data/. 
114 Nir Kshetri, Blockchain Systems Are Tracking Food Safety and Origins, THE 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2018 6:49 AM), https://theconversation.com/blockchain-
systems-are-tracking-food-safety-and-origins-106491. 
115 See NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
116 Les Wilkinson et. al., Blockchain Meets Healthcare: Understanding the Business 
Model and Implementing Initiatives, 2017 ACC DOCKET 57, 59, https://www.nelso 
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Permissioned systems could also avoid proof of work consensus 
mechanisms, avoiding substantial energy consumption and 
environmental impacts upon scaling up.117  
 
If permissioned platforms advance, questions may arise 
about whether industry or government entities will hold centralized 
control of the blockchain to grant permission to participate and add 
blocks.118 The potential public health utility and existing government 
stewardship over WGS databases may support placing public actors 
in control of permissioned blockchains. Federal regulators 
administering the permissioned systems may maximize 
accountability for industry and the effectiveness of enforcement 
actions.119 The possibility of deliberate food contamination in acts of 
agroterrorism120 may provide further rationale for federal 
government control. Yet, the technology and supply chain industries 
will likely lead the efforts to build blockchain infrastructure in the 
food supply chain.121 Despite incentivizes to minimize fiscal harm 
from contamination, blockchain development will require private 
firms to expend notable resources in a competitive market. 
Accordingly, economic factors will likely disincentivize industry 
members who have invested the most in creating and maintaining 
platforms to cede control of their permissioned systems to federal 
food safety regulators.122  
 
nmullins.com/storage/4db2ba62b5531942d89ab659e2921280.pdf (“Depending on 
the industry, knowing who is on the network may not only be desired but legally 
required.”). 
117 See Camilo Mora et al., Bitcoin Emissions Alone Could Push Global Warming 
Above 2°C, 2018 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1.   
118 Australia recently announced a pilot project for a national blockchain to act as a 
platform for blockchain based commerce in Australia, highlighting the possibility of 
a state-run blockchain for commercial and potentially regulatory functions. See 
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.australiannationalblockchain.co 
m/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).   
119 Direct federal control would facilitate more traditional command and control 
regulation, often perceived as more accountable, transparent, and directly 
enforceable. See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, ‘Governing’ 
Nanotechnology Without Government?, 35 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477 (2008). 
120 U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-310, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 28–29 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf. 
121 Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and Logistics 
Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018 
/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#1f 
be6eb45fec (highlighting use cases all arising from private industry). 
122 REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE 18, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2000), https://www.oecd.org/ 




Further governance challenges could arise in the decision for 
public or private blockchain architecture. A public blockchain could 
enable public health officials globally to monitor food safety in the 
supply chain without procedural constraints on gaining access to the 
blockchain, likely leading to improved foodborne illness responses. 
The open-access model of a public ledger may also offer the most 
pragmatic interface between blockchain and the growing 
international adoption of GenomeTrakr and the PulseNet 
International network of WGS public health laboratories.123 
However, a public design would also enable any other party to view 
data on the chain, including competitors, yielding corporate 
confidentiality dilemmas.124 Accordingly, businesses generally seek 
to utilize private blockchains.125 Off-chain storage of confidential 
data could ease such concerns, but off-chain storage can carry 
independent security vulnerabilities.126 Though a public blockchain 
could maximize transparency in supply chain governance,127 
business incentives may resist regulatory moves granting 
competitors access to confidential supply chain and compliance data.  
 
The presence of competition in crafting blockchain 
platforms for the food supply chain also highlights the potential for 
interoperability challenges.128 Given the competitive pressures to 
protect confidential data, each supply chain manager will likely 
 
gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (illustrating how corporate “[c]ompliance rates 
are lower when regulation does not fit well with existing market practices or is not 
supported by cultural norms and civic institutions.”). 
123 See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 10. 
124 See Charlebois, supra note 12. Developing new tools for blockchain platforms, 
including zero knowledge proofs, may mitigate the disclosure of confidential data 
by enabling parties to reveal no more data than is required for a given transaction. 
See Vinayaka Pandit & Pankaj Dayama, Privacy in Blockchain Collaboration with 
Zero Knowledge Proofs, IBM BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/bl 
ockchain/2019/01/privacy-in-blockchain-collaboration-with-zero-knowledge-proof 
s/. 
125 See Jayachandran, supra note 74. 
126 Ana Reyna et al., On Blockchain and Its Integration with IoT. Challenges and 
Opportunities, 88 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEMS 173, 177 (2018).  
127 Benjamin Herzberg, Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product 
Supply Chains, PROVENANCE (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.provenance.org/whitepa 
per. 
128 As in health care, blockchain is not an inherent solution to interoperability and 
issues will likely develop when blockchain platforms are implemented. Raj Sharma, 
Don’t Look to Blockchain to Solve Healthcare’s Interoperability Woes, FORBES 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/18/dont-
look-to-blockchain-to-solve-healthcares-interoperability-woes/#7a19bd5e6eab. 
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obtain and operate their own blockchain with limited incentives to 
ensure it could interface with others.129 Moreover, firms will lack 
incentives to switch to a new, more centralized blockchain platform 
once committed to one, as logged data will remain on the original 
blockchain and protocols to transfer data to a new blockchain remain 
limited.130 Food blockchains lacking interoperability may complicate 
efforts by public health officials to effectively track foodborne illness 
outbreaks and apply WGS data, particularly when outbreaks span 
facilities and regions involving multiple supply chains.131 Food 
products packaged with multiple types of ingredients,132 potentially 
tracked through different blockchains, may exacerbate 
interoperability challenges.133 Government pressure or mandates to 
create interoperable platforms could be opposed by industry, citing 
potential anticompetitive effects.134 
 
 No simple solution exists to these governance challenges, 
given the conflicting public health and business interests in designing 
and deploying a blockchain to integrate with existing WGS 
operations. Overly aggressive actions or requirements by regulators, 
even made in the interest of public health, may disincentivize 
industry from ever developing the blockchain platforms.135 
Command and control regulatory approaches administered by a 
central government may suffer from perceived or real inefficiency, 
 
129 Absent standardization or other pressures, blockchain developers will have 
significant latitude to build unique platforms to the specifications of individual 
clients, likely resulting in interoperability issues. See DAVID SCHATSKY, ET. AL., 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE FIVE VECTORS OF PROGRESS 4, DELOITTE, (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4600_Blockchain-five-
vectors/DI_Blockchain-five-vectors.pdf. 
130 See JAIKARAN, supra note 109, at 8. 
131 See Aung & Chang, supra note 57, at 178. 
132 John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and 
Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008, 
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 408–09 (2013) (describing these products 
as “complex foods”). 
133 See BLOCKCHAIN USE CASES FOR FOOD TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL 23, KAIROS 
FUTURE (2017), https://www.sklkommentus.se/globalassets/kommentus/bilder/publ 
ication-eng-blockchain-for-food-traceability-and-control-2017.pdf.  
134 See IOANNIS LIANOS, BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION: GAINING COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 73 (2018), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/c 
les/files/cles_8-2018.pdf. 
135 See Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/cr 
ypto-industry-regulation.html. 
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overly burdensome costs to industry, and restricting flexibility to 
innovate with emerging blockchain systems.136  
 
Instead, handling the synthesis of WGS methods and 
blockchain in the food supply chain may benefit from “softer” 
regulatory approaches. As opposed to command and control 
schemes, softer approaches offer a spectrum of regulatory 
mechanisms lacking traditional legal enforceability.137 So called 
“soft law” enables more voluntary, innovative, and adaptable 
regulatory possibilities by expanding definitions of oversight to 
include regulation by private or public-private entities.138 Limitations 
of these softer approaches should guide their implementation and 
combination, including the potential for reduced legitimacy, 
inconsistent enforcement, and regulatory capture, as well as 
coordination issues in public-private settings.139  
 
Softer oversight should offer useful tools for advancing the 
effective combination of blockchain and WGS technologies while 
responding to governance challenges. Public-private or voluntary 
oversight programs140 may ease tensions between government or 
industry control over permissioned blockchains through leaving 
control with industry while creating infrastructure for collaboration. 
Such arrangements could promote the flow of blockchain and WGS 
data across the public-private border during an outbreak while also 
enabling government information gathering to measure the 
effectiveness of blockchain implementation.141 Federal regulators 
already facilitate food industry action on traceability without 
 
136 Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False 
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 530 (1997). 
137 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401–
02 (2000). 
138 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 103, 105–
12 (2001); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 
BUS. & SOC. 68, 69–70 (2010). 
139 See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 119, at 477. 
140 See Kenneth W. Abbott, et. al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for 
Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS 279, 298–300 (2017) (describing voluntary and 
partnership programs in nanotechnology). 
141 See GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING 5, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM (2016) (describing the utility of information sharing in collaboratively 
addressing cybercrime); Gary E. Marchant, et. al., Risk Management Principles for 
Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 43, 53–54 (2008) (describing information gathering 
as a preliminary governance tool for emerging technologies). 
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wielding formal regulatory power. Following the November 2018 
lettuce contamination, FDA coordinated stakeholders in forming a 
task force to generate recommendations for improving traceability 
with labeling.142 These existing relationships could provide the 
groundwork for close collaboration on governing blockchain and 
WGS tools. 
 
Technical standards, another soft regulatory tool, could 
promote interoperability and facilitate common blockchain 
architecture for WGS compatibility.143 Third party standards can 
provide technical guideposts to direct and stimulate innovation in 
nascent technologies with various forms.144 Civilian standard setting 
bodies with high credibility including ISO and IEEE could build on 
their existing projects on blockchain145 to craft standards for 
interoperability in food safety applications and WGS compatibility. 
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology could 
provide a similar function as a public entity with expertise on 
blockchain,146 crafting voluntary standards with stakeholder input to 
encourage data fluidity across blockchains and intersections with 
public genomic databases.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
  
Blockchain and WGS represent powerful emerging 
technologies capable of bolstering regulatory and corporate response 
to foodborne illnesses. The technologies carry complementary 
strengths, combining increased traceability and accountability in the 
food supply chain with enhanced identification of pathogens and 
location of origin. With the clear potential to advance public health, 
the convergence of blockchain and WGS appears inevitable. 
 
142 See FDA Update, supra note 60. 
143 For a review of blockchain technical features amenable to standardization, see 
Advait Deshpande et al., Understanding the Landscape of Distributed Ledger 
Technologies/Blockchain, RAND (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_rep 
orts/RR2223.html. 
144 Knut Blind, et. al., The Impacts of Standards and Regulation on Innovation in 
Uncertain Markets, 46 RES. POL’Y 249, 258 (2017). 
145 ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology, ISO, 
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604/x/catalogue/p/0/u/1/w/0/d/0 (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2019); P2418.3 – Standard for the Framework of Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT) Use in Agriculture, IEEE, https://standards.ieee.org/project/2418 
_3.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
146 See NIST Report, supra note 6, at ii. 
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However, synthesis and implementation will require addressing 
technical and governance challenges.  
 
Government-based WGS operations must effectively 
intersect with industry-driven blockchain developments to realize the 
promise of both technologies. Questions arise over whether public or 
private entities should retain control of permissioned platforms, 
whether to use public or private blockchain architectures, and how to 
address interoperability. Soft regulatory approaches offer a path to 
balancing public and private interests in resolving these governance 
challenges, though selecting exact oversight instruments should be 
reevaluated as both technologies mature independently and together. 
Successfully navigating governance and technical challenges to 
bring blockchain and WGS together, though complex, should 
promote public health and reduce foodborne illness burdens. 
